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NOTES.
LAw SCHOOL-DEATH OF HON. ROBERT RALSTON-In the loss
of Hon. Robert Ralston, Judge of the Court of Common Pleas of
Philadelphia County, and an Auxiliary Lecturer in the Law School,
whose death occurred in the Jefferson Hospital on January twentythird as a result of cerebral meningities which had developed from a
severe attack of pneumonia, the Law School has lost a devoted
alumnus and friend.
Judge Ralston, who was the son of Francis W. Ralston and
Elizabeth C. Meredith, and a grandson of William M. Meredith, a
distinguished member of the Philadelphia Bar, was born in Philadelphia on March iI, 1863. He was graduated from the Law School
of the University of Pennsylvania in 1885, after having won the
Faculty Prize for the best examination in all subjects in 1884, and
(381)
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the Sharswood Prize in 1885, for the best essay by a member of the
graduating class.
From 1892 until 1896 he served as Assistant United States
Attorney for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. In ioi he was
elevated to the Bench, and from that time until his death served the
Commonwealth with distinction. He was for years interested in the
scientific development of the law and was largely instrumental in the
passage of the recent Practice Act of 1915. He was an earnest student of criminal law and procedure and in 1915 served as President
of the American Institute of Criminal Law and Criminology.
Since 19o7 Judge Ralston delivered lectures each year in the
Law School on the Trial of Criminal Causes, which were attended
by a large number of students. He was a frequent contributor to the
LAW REVIEW and was ever willing and anxious to give to others the
benefit of his suggestions and advice. His loss will be keenly felt,
not alone by those who knew him personally, but as well by all who
have an interest in the welfare of the Law School.

CONFLICT OF LAWS-EXTRA-TERRITORIAL

EFFECT OF FOREIGN

is a mass of decisions on the subject of foreign
judgments, but it is surprising to learn how few, from the point of
view of international lav, touch upon the interesting and unique
question decided in the recent English case of Harrisv. Taylor.'
The problem presented was: Does a non-resident served with
process outside the jurisdiction, by entering a conditional appearance, thereby submit to the jurisdiction and law of the court out of
which the process issues for all purposes, when the law of that
forum considers a conditional appearance as conferring jurisdiction over the person?
The plaintiff brought an action in the Isle of Man against the
defendant, a domiciled Englishman, claiming damages for criminal
conversation with the plaintiff's wife. Service was obtained in
England. The defendant then caused a conditional appearance to be
entered to set aside the writ for lack of proper service. This contention was overruled and the writ adjudged to have been duly
served. A judgment was subsequently obtained, the defendant
not having further answered nor appeared in the proceedings. This
judgment was then sought to be enforced in England. It was held
by the English Court of Appeals that the defendant by entering an
appearance had submitted to the jurisdiction of the Isle of Man
since by that law such an appearance was converted into a general
appearance. The defendant was bound thereby and the judgment
subsequently rendered was valid and would be enforced in England.
It is fundamental that in order that effect may be given abroad
JUDGMENTS-There

113 L. T. 221 (Eng. 1915).

NOTES

to a judgment, the court rendering it must have the requisite jurisdiction. If the judgment or decree be in rem, it is only necessary
that the res be within the jurisdiction and that a general publication
of notice of the suit be given. If in personam, it is essential that
the court should have obtained jurisdiction of the defendant's person, either by his voluntary appearance and submission, or by personal service of process upon him within the territorial limits of the
court's authority.2 No court can lawfully adjudge rights of persons
or property in the absence of such jurisdiction. At least such judgments will not be given extra-territorial
effect. 3 This principle is
4
law.
English
firmly established in the
Nothing is more clear, therefore, than that the service of process in the case under discussion was insufficient. Was there a
voluntary appearance and submission to the court's jurisdiction?
It is submitted that there was. It is perfectly obvious that if the
defendant had done nothing at all in the matter, after having been
so served, any judgment obtained against him would have been a
mere nullity in another jurisdiction, but instead of this he entered a
conditional appearance and contested the jurisdiction of the court. 5
He thereby became bound by the law of the Isle o Man, which
converted a conditional appearance into a general appearance. He
placed himself in such a position that it became his duty to obey the
judgment of the foreign court, which judgment is enforceable
against him in any country where it is sought to be enforced.
Of course, it is not contended that a state can by a statute give
jurisdiction to its courts over a citizen of another state. who has
not been served with process within the jurisdiction and who does
not appear in the action. At least a judgment rendered pursuant
to such a statute, upon substituted service, would be void in every
other jurisdiction. The theory is, however, that when the defendant chooses to appear, when not bound to do so, he becomes
subject to the consequences of the statute. The only argument to
the contrary would seem to be that in the absence of such a statute,
2For
the historical development and a risum6 of the enforcement of
foreign
judgments,
see Wharton, Conflict of Laws, pp. 518-539.
3
Such judgments are not protected by the Constitution of the United
States from attack for want of jurisdiction in another forum. Thompson
v. Whitman, 18 Wall. 461 (U. S. 1873).
Schibsby v. Westenholz, L. R. 6 Q. B. 155 (Eng. 1870); Voinet v.
Barrett, 55 L. J. Q. Div. 39 (Eng. 1885).
The appearance was not for the purpose of protecting property in the
Isle of Man, in which case different considerations might have arisen. It is
settled in England that, while an appearance by the defendant in a court of
a foreign country for the purpose of protecting his property already in the
possession of that court, may not be deemed a voluntary appearance, yet an
appearance solely for the purpose of protecting other property in that country
from seizure is considered as a voluntary appearance. De Cosse Brissac v.
Rathbone. 6 H. and M. .1oi (Eng. i86o); Schibsby v. Westenholz. supra;
Voinet v. Barrett, supra, note 4.
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such an appearance is not considered a voluntary submission to the
jurisdiction, and, therefore, the mere presence of such a statute
cannot alter the character of the appearance from the defendant's
point of view. This might be answered by the contention that even
in the absence of such a statute the conditional appearance is in fact
a voluntary submission, though not considered as such by the
courts, which do not attach to it the consequences imposed by the
statute. Whether this be an answer or not, however, the fact remains that that theory has had little weight with the courts.
There are comparatively few cases in the United States'which
touch upon the problem involved. The Supreme Court of the
United States failed to decide the question in the case of York v.
Texas.6 But there is one case, not referred to by the English
court, which apparently raises the same kind of question, and the
reasoning and opinion of the court -applies with great force to the
problem presented.7 A statute of the State of Texas authorized
service on a non-resident outside the limits of the state. By this
same statute the filing of an answer was constituted an appearance
of the defendant. The defendant, a non-resident, was served outside the state, but proceeded to file an answer, in which he first
set up the lack of jurisdiction and then proceeded to answer the
demand. His contention as to lack of jurisdiction of his person was
overruled and judgment was subsequently rendered against him.
The validity of this judgment was thereafter questioned in New
York, where the defendant resisted, on the ground that the Texas
court had never acquired jurisdiction, and that his special appearance, although coupled with an answer, did not preclude him from
raising the question of jurisdiction at any subsequent time.8 The
court in its opinion, after admitting the defendant's contention in
the absence of statute, said, "We think the judgment of the Texas
court became, and is a binding, adjudication on the defendant
herein, for the reason that the defendant, by filing an answer, became bound by the statute law of the state." He was, therefore,
bound by the consequences Which the statute affixed to such a
proceeding.
' 137 U. S. 15 (i8go).
The case does not raise the question as to the
effect to be given a foreign judgment since it was not sought to be enforced
in another jurisdiction.
T'Jones v. Jones, io8 N. Y. 415 (i888).
'In the absence of a statute such as existed in Texas, there are many
decisions to the effect that a party not properly served with process, so as
to give the court jurisdiction of his person, does not waive the obligation
or confer jurisdiction by answering over and going to trial on the merits
after he has ineffectually objected to the jurisdiction and his objection has
been overruled. Harkness v. Hyde, 98 U. S.476 (1878) ; Steamship Co. v.
Tugman, io6 U. S. ri8 (1882); Walling v. Beers, I2o Mass. 548 (1876). But
there is some authority contra. McCullough v. Railway Mail Assn., 225
Pa. x8 (igog). See note to Corbett v. Casualty Association, 16 L. R. A.
(N. S.) 177 (19o8).

NOTES

It may safely be stated, therefore, that both authority and logic
support the view taken by the court in Harris v. Taylor, that
where a statute of this character is in operation such conditional
appearance is to be considered a voluntary appearance and submission to the jurisdiction of the court.
L.W.

CONSTITURIONAL LAW--AN ARGUMENT TO SUPPORT THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE WEBB-KENYON ACT-The Webb-Kenyon

Act of 1913' provides in substance that it shall be unlawful to
transport into any state intoxicating liquor which is intended by
any person interested therein to be received, sold or in any manner
used, either in the original package or otherwise, in violation of
any law of the state into which it is shipped. Any discussion concerning the constitutionality of this act must of necessity have for
a background its predecessor, the Wilson Act of I89O,2 and the
case In re Rahrer,3 in which the constitutionality of the latter act
was upheld. An Iowa statute prohibiting the sale of liquors, except
for medicinal purposes, had been held unconstitutional as applied
to liquor brought from other states and sold in the original packages. 4 The inability on the part of the states to control the sale
of liquor in this form was removed by the Wilson Act, which made
liquor transported into any state, upon its arrival in such state,
subject to the operation of the laws of that state enacted in the
exercise of its police powers, to the same extent as though produced
in that state, and regardless of whether it still remained in its
original package. The act was held not to constitute a delegation
of power to the states and was declared constitutional.
It is obvious, at the beginning, that the objection to the validity
of the state statute in Leisy v. Hardinr cannot have been a constitutional one, since had it violated the Constitution of the United
States, Congress could not later, by its assent, give a similar state
act validity, which would be, in effect, an alteration of the Constitution by an act of Congress. The alternative is that the former
statute was in conflict with the assumed will of Congress, which
objection was removed by the Wilson Act.
The power of Congress to provide that an object of interstate
commerce shall be divested of its interstate character at a point
earlier than it otherwise would be is considered in In re Rahrer and
the right affirmed. It would seem, however, that the case should
i913 § 8739].
26 Stat. 313 [U. S. Comp. St. 1goI, p. 3177].

1Act Mar. I, 1913, c. 90, 37 Stat. 699 [U. S. Comp. St.

'Act Aug. 8, i8go, c. 728,

s140 U. S. 545 (1890).
'Leisy v. Hardin, 135 U. S. IOO (i8go).

'Supra, note 4.
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be sustained upon some other and sounder theory. For if Congress, as it was there intimated, does possess the power to define
interstate commerce and what constitutes objects of interstate commerce, it is apparent that it might, by a broad and all-embracing
definition, greatly augment its powers; or, by adopting the opposite
extreme, it might consummate a practical delegation of its power
to regulate interstate commerce to the states.
While the constitutionality of the Webb-Kenyon law as yet
remains to be passed upon by the Supreme Court of the United
States, its validity has been the subject of considerable discussion
among the lower courts. Perhaps the most recent of these opinions
is in Southern Express Company v. Whittle.' where it was stated
that the power to regulate commerce necessarily comprehends the
power to define it, and likewise to distinguish "between things deleterious and things beneficial and innocuous," and to deny absolutely or conditionally entrance into such commerce to those things
which are deleterious. The power to do the latter Congress undoubtedly possesses, but there appears to be an essential difference
between a conditional or absolute exclusion prescribed by Congress
that is uniform throughout the United States, and a delegation to
each state 6f the right to determine, in the exercise of its police
power, which, among articles of commerce generally conceded to be
legitimate, it conceives to be deleterious, and to exclude such articles from interstate commerce. It is upon this power if exclusion,
absolute or conditional, that another recent case, State of West Virginia v. Adams Express Company7 purports to sustain the WebbKenyon Act.
Indeed, the act is entitled: "An act divesting intoxicating
liquors of their interstate character in certain cases." In a lengthy
and well-considered opinion, Mr. Chief Justice Pennewill, in State
v. Grier,8 upheld the act with the following argument: "If an article
of commerce can be divested of its interstate attributes and shorn of
its protection, in part, by an act of Congress, it is difficult to see why
it cannot be wholly divested of such attributes in a state whose laws
seek to control it for the good of its citizens. If it is possible, under
a federal act, to legally prevent its sale in the original package at the
point of destination, why cannot its transportation within the state
to such point be equally prevented?"
It seems clear that if it be assumed that Congress has power to
define interstate commerce, and that In re Rahrer went to the
extent of so holding, the force of this argument is irresistible. But
in view of the possible practical consequences, already indicated, of
the exercise of such a power by Congress, principle as well as
'69 So. 652 (Ala. 1915).
'2ig Fed. 794 (915).
88 At. 579 (Del. 1913).

NOTES
authority opposes such an assumption.9 The definition of interstate
commerce is a judicial and not a legislative function, and its definition cannot be qualified or limited by Congress.
The act under discussion admittedly goes a step further than
the Wilson Act in that it prohibits the transportation rather than the
sale of articles under certain conditions. One is reminded of the
early variance of opinion as to the meaning of the word "exclusive"
when applied to the power of Congress to regulate interstate commerce, Mr. Chief Justice Marshall taking the view that it had
reference to the power exercised,' and Mr. Chief Justice Taney
taking the position that it had reference to that upon which the
law operated." The act under discussion unquestionably sanctions
the interference by states with interstate commerce in a matter
of national concern and the imposition of a direct burden upon it,
which, in the. absence of congressional action, would have been
invalid. 12 The decision in In re Rahrer seems to indicate a harking
back to the conception of Mr. Chief Justice Marshall, that the
assertion that the power of Congress in this particular is "exclusive" has reference to the power exerted and not to the effect of its
operation. And very recently the power of Congress to regulate
interstate commerce
has been characterized by the Supreme Court as
"exclusive." 3 Taken altogether, these cases furnish some ground,
at least, for the belief that the court is returning to this earlier conception which, though open to the objection pointed out by Mr.
Chief Justice Taney that all state laws are in a sense police regulations, and that the importance of a state act from the constitutional viewpoint lies not in the motive of the legislature enacting it,
but in the effect of the act in its application, is a theory on which
In re Rahrer is clearly sustainable.
It would seem, therefore, that the only -impediment to the imposition by a state of a direct burden on interstate commerce in the
bona fide exercise of its police power, is the assumed will of Congress. The assent of Congress given in advance, being an unequivocal expression of its will, permits state legislation of this type,
the safeguard against the actual delegation of power by Congress
lying in the qualification that the state's action may not be a regulation of interstate commerce as such, but must be an exercise
of its police power.
The decisions involving the Webb-Kenyon Act have been concerned with its application more often than with its constitutional-

'Brown v. Maryland, 12 Wheaton 419 (1826).
"Williamson v. Black Bird Creek Co., 2 Peters 245 (T829).
"License Cases, 5 Howard 504 (1846).
"Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 12 Howard

" Sligh v. Kirkwood, 237 U. S. 52 (1914).

299

(185).
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ity, some interesting situations having arisen. 14 It is submitted,
however, that under the above theory, the constitutionality both
of this act and of the Wilson Act is sustainable.
B. M. K.

INTERNATIONAL LAW-WHAT IS THE PRESENT STATUS 0F
ENEMY SHAREHOLDERS IN ENGLISH COMPANIES?-In view of the

magnitude and extensiveness of modern commercial enterprises, it
may seem surprising that there are very few reported cases dealing with the effect of the outbreak of the present war upon the
rights and obligations of persons, resident in one country, who hold
stock in corporations doing business in an enemy country. The
absence of litigation on this. question is principally accounted for
by the fact that each of the belligerent countries has its own
municipal law on the subject, contained in executive proclamations and statutory enactments. Occasionally, however, situations
arise that are not specifically provided for by the municipal law,
and then the rules of international law, such as they are, must be
relied upon.
An alien, not an enemy, is, of course, not prevented from
being a stockholder in a corporation.' On the other hand, a person cannot become a stockholder after war has broken out between
his country and the country where the corporation is chartered
and conducting its business. In legal contemplation, the subjects
of two hostile countries are enemies, and so long as the war lasts,
they are unable to enter into any binding contracts with one
another. Consequently, it is clear that during the continuance of
the war, an agreement by a German to become a member of an
2

1In James Clark Distilling Co. v. Western Maryland Ry. Co., 219 Fed.
333 (914), a statute of West Virginia prohibited the sale of intoxicants
within the state and declared that as to liquor shipped into the state, the
sale should be deemed to be made at the place of delivery. The District
Court held that the state could not forbid the sale of liquors in another
state nor say that what by the general law was a completed sale in Maryland was a sale in West Virginia. The court construed the statute as being
intended merely to make certain the county in which offenders were to be
prosecuted. But in considering the same statute the Circuit Court of Appeals
later held that the legislature had power to provide that the place of delivery should be the place of sale, which under the circumstances was tantamount to a prohibition against receipt and delivery. State of West Virginia
v. Adams Express Co., supra, note 7. In Hamm Brewing Co. v. Chicago,
etc., Ry. Co., 215 Fed. 672 (1913), a statute of Iowa prohibited the transportation by any common carrier of liquors unless the consignee had a permit. It was held that the carrier was not justified in refusing a shipment
consigned to one who had no permit. It was pointed out that the WebbKenyon Act prohibits the transportation only when it was intended to be
received, used, etc., in violation of the law, and does not prohibit transportation in violation of the law.
'Reg. v. Arnauld, 16 L. J. Q. B. 5o (Eng. 1847).

NOTES

English company, or of an Englishman to become an actieninhaber
of a German gesellschaft, cannot be enforced.2
The effect of war upon the status of an alien enemy, holding
stock in a corporation before the outbreak of hostilities, was,
until very recently, never judicially decided in this country or
Great Britain.3 Moreover, fundamentally different conclusions are
reached by the few writers on international law who discuss the
situation.'
Some authorities declare that an alien enemy shareholder forfeits his membership as soon as the war breaks out,. that he is
entitled to be paid the value of his shares estimated as of the
time of the commencement of the war, and that this claim is collectable upon the termination of hostilities. A French writer asserts that the rule prohibiting intercourse applies equally "au.
associations commercides formies entre les suiets des deux nations
avant ou aprbs la dbclaraction de guerre."5 The leading exponent
of this point of view today, Dr. T. Baty, 6 applies the doctrine of
non-intercourse with utmost rigor. The rights of shareholders in a
corporation are contractual. The contracts upon which they are
based are executory, contemplating a continuing liability on the
shareholders for calls on shares, a continuing obligation on the
'See note in 64 UNIv. OF PENNA. L. REv. 8I for a survey of the rules
as to trading with the enemy.
'The case of Ex Parte Boussmaker, 13 Ves. "i (Eng. i8o6) has been
considered to have decided that the rights and liabilities of an alien enemy
shareholder would be suspended during the war, and that such a person
does not ipso facto cease to be a member of the company. Lindley: "Law of
Companies," vol. I, p. 53 (Ed. "io2). It is submitted that this case does
not go to that extent, but only decides that an alien's right to recover a dividend in bankruptcy revives on the restoration of peace, the liability having
arisen out of a contract entered into before the outbreak of the war. The
case of Continental Tyre and Rubber Company v. Daimler Company, i K.
B. 893 (Eng. I915) has a remote bearing, if any, upon the problem. It was
there decided that a company formed under English laws and doing business in England could recover a debt due the company notwithstanding the
fact that its directors and shareholders were alien enemies, on the grourld
that the entity alone could be regarded and that in no circumstances could
the debt be treated as a debt to the individual shareholders.
' It should be noted at the outset that whether a person is to be regarded
as an alien enemy depends not upon his nationality, but rather upon whether
he is voluntarily resident in the land of the enemy. See Albrecht v. Sussman, 2 Ves. & B. 323 (Eng. 1813); Wells v. Williams, i Salk. 46 (Eng. 6.97).
A doubtful question arises as to the enemy character of a corporation holding stock in another corporation, the difficulty lying in the question as to
whether the corporation has but one "residence" or whether it may be regarded as "resident" wherever it has any place of business. See Lindley:
Companies, vol. I, p. 54; Jones v. Scottish Accident Ins. Co., i7 Q. B. D.
421 (Eng. 1886). The enemy character of a company will not be determined
by ascertaining whether the majority of its shareholders are enemies. See
Jarson v. Dreifontein Mines, Ltd., A. C. 484 (Eng. i9o2).
'C. Calvo: "Le Droit International" (Paris, 1888-1896), § i93o.
'T. Baty: "International Law in South Africa" (London, igoo), p. 94.
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corporation to pay periodical dividends, and a continuing right
in the shareholders to help manage the business of the corporation.
Ihe war, consequently, should abrogate and dissolve absolutely the
relationship of the shareholders with the corporation.
The advocates of this theory hold that the effect of war upon
the shareholder's status should be treated as analogous, to a certain extent, to the case of partnerships. It is well settled that commercial partnerships between the subjects of opposing belligerents
-ire ipso facto dissolved by the declaration of war.7 This rule is
based upon the fact that the power of mutual control of the partners is gone, and that one should not derive any profit out of hi;
partner's trade in an enemy's country. Furthermore, since it is
difficult for the partners to continue the business, when the war
is ended, at the point where it was abandoned, it is held that the
partnership is dissolved, and not merely suspended. Dr. Baty
suggests that while the corporation should continue to exist, the
enemy shareholders should be dropped from membership.
A contrary view is taken by other modern writers, notablv
by Mr. Norman Bentwitch,8 who points out that the essential differences between corporations and partnerships require that -the
effect of war be different in the two cases. Shareholders, as distinguished from partners, are limitedly liable, they have no substantial power of control over the corporation, and they constitute, theoretically, a distinct legal entity. It is hardly likely, this
author thinks, that it would be detrimental to national security to
allow an enemy shareholder to retain his rights and liabilities
during the war. "The structure of modern commerce," he says,
"and the vast number of companies which comprise shareholders
of all nations, demand that the old thumb-rule about the abrogation of executory contracts, which was never meant to apply to
these new circumstances,- should not arbitrarily and unreasonably
be extended to them."
The only necessary measure, therefore,
is to suspend merely the payment of dividends until the resumption
of peace, allowing interest to accrue until that time, and it is
inadvisable to interfere with the slight control that an enemy
shareholder may have in a corporation.
The single case that flatly decides what the rights of a Ger'Griswold v. Waddington, 15 Johns. 57 (N. Y. 1818), 16 Johns. 438 (N.
Y. i8ig) ; Esposito v. Bowden, 7 E. & B. 785 (Eng. 1857) ; Planter's Bank v.

St. John, I Woods 585 (U. S. 1869).
'Bentwitch: "War and Private Property," p. 58. See also R. A. Chadwick: "Foreign Investments in Time of War," 2o L. Q. R. 167 (1904).
'Compare the language of Mr. Justice Gray in Kershaw v. Kelsey, ioo
Mass. 561 (i868): "At this age of the world, when all the tendencies of
the law of nations are to exempt individuals and private contracts from injury or restraint in consequence of war between their governments, we are
not disposed to declare such contracts unlawful as have not been heretofore
adjudged to be inconsistent with a state of war."

NOTES

man shareholder in an English company during the war are has
just been decided. In Robson v. Premier Oil and Pipe Line Company, Ltd.,' Lord Justice Pickford, who delivered the opinion
for the Court of Appeals, holding that German shareholders have
not the right to vote for directors of an English company, nor to
exercise such a right by proxy. The court adopted the view of
Professor Westlake," who takes a middle-ground, holding that
the shareholder continues to be a member of the company, but his
rights and liabilities are suspended during the continuance of hostilities. This is essentially a compromise.
It is difficult to see how the exercise of the voting power by
the shareholders in an English trading company may be detrimental
to the interests of Great Britain or to the advantage of her enemies. While patriotism may be confined within the borders of
one's native land, modern business does not know such narrow
limitations. The network of commercial relations has become
world-wide, and it is necessary, in order to maintain stability of
credit, to afford foreign investors in time of peace such security
as will encourage them to supply capital for extensive business
enterprises. It would seem advisable, therefore, to refrain from
interfering with international trade relationships, unless absolutely
essential to safeguard the interests of the nation.
L.E.L.
LiniL-PRIvLErGED Co1MMUNICATIONs-GRAND JURORs-The
foundation for the immunity of privileged communications in slander and libel is public policy. Sometimes it is so much to the
public interest that one should be able to speak one's mind freely,
without fear of the consequences, that the law will excuse even
intentionally and wilfully false and harmful statements concerning another. At other times, the interest of the public at large
does not demand so sweeping an immunity, but requires merely
that one be absolved from responsibility only so long as his statements are made in good faith, and without actual evil intent. In
the former the immunity is absolute; in the latter it is qualified.
An important form of privilege is that accorded to persons
taking part in the administration of justice. The exact extent of
the privilege may vary according to the person who claims it and
10113 L. T. Rep. 523 (Eng. 1915).
113

L. T. Rep. uS (T915),

In Rex v. London County Council,
Lord Chief justice Reading intimated that an

alien enemy should not be allowed to vote by proxy on his shares in an
English company. This opinion, which was merely obiter dictum, was put
on the ground that the alien enemy did not have the capacity to give authority
to a proxy in England.
'Westlake: "International Law," Part II, p. 53. See also Phillipson:
"Effect of War on Contracts," p. zo2.
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the jurisdiction in which it is claimed, but it may be stated broadly
that judges, parties, counsel and witnesses may not be sued for
defamatory words uttered during the course of judicial proceedirgs. 1 So also it is held that whatever may be said by one juror
to another in the jury room while the2 verdict is being considered,
cannot be the subject of a civil action..
It is also settled. that presentments, indictments and reports
made by a grand jury under the authority conferred upon that
body by the law of the particular jurisdiction, cannot be the basis
of a civil action. 3 This is so no matter how erroneous the act of
the jury may be, or how malicious the motive which inspired it.The acts of the grand jury in discharge of their duties are absolutely privileged. An interesting question arises, however, where
the grand jury takes some action which is not authorized by the
powers granted to it.
On this point there is a recent decision of the Court of Civil
Appeals of Texas, which is of interest.' The grand jury. regu.larly impaneled for the purpose of discharging its ordinary duties,
turned into court a written report, of its findings, containing a
statement that the sheriff of the county was guilty of immoral
conduct unbecoming his office, but no indictment was presented
against him. By the law of the state, such a proceeding was not a
part of the duties of the grand jury. The sheriff sued the members of the grand jury for libel, but was met with a demurrer,
which was sustained by the trial court on the ground that the
report of the jury was a privileged communication, and could
not be made the basis of a suit for libel. On appeal, however,
it was held that the lower court had erred in sustaining the
demurrer.
This case is similar .to the earlier case of Rector v. Smith.
decided in Iowa in 186o.6 There it was expressly stated by the
court that a grand jury's report which was unauthorized by law
was not a privileged communication; but the actual decision was
that as the grand juror who was sued asserted that he had acted
without malice or ill-will toward the plaintiff, and in the belief
'Judges: Scott v. Stansfield, L. R. 3 Ex. 220 (Eng. 1868). Parties: McDavitt v. Boyer, 169 Ill. 475 (1897); Badgley v. Hedges, 2 N. J. L. 233
(18o7). Counsel: Munster v. Lamb, ii Q. B. D. 588 (Eng. 1883); Hollis v.
Meux, 69 Cal. 625 (x886).
Witnesses: Buchsbaum v. Heriot, 5 Ga. App.
521 (19o8).
'Durham v. Powers, 42 Vt. I (1869).
Sidener v. Russell, 34 I1. App. 446 (1889) ; Fisk v. Soniat, 33 La. Ann.
1400 (I881).
4
Turpen v. Booth, 56 Cal. 65 (i88o); Hunter v. Mathis, 40 Ind. 356
(1872).
5

Rich v. Eason, i8o S. W. 303 (Tex. 1915).

o,1 Ia.
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(186o).
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that the report was within the scope of his duty, he was not liable.
however, to holding that the report was qualifiedly
This amounts,
7
privileged.

The exact view of the court in the principal case is difficult
to ascertain. It does not appear whether the grand jury acted in
good faith and without ill-will in making the objectionable report,
and the court does not refer to that point. This would lead to
the belief that the court deemed it unimportant, and meant to deny
all privilege whatsoever, both absolute and qualified, in cases where
a grand jury publishes a defamation outside the scope of its duties.
On the other hand, the court quotes with approval the case of
Rector v. Smith, which would indicate that it merely refused to
grant absolute privilege, and that it was assumed that the grand
jury had acted with actual malice.
The reason that grand jurors are not liable for their words
or acts, no matter -what their motives, while acting as members
of the grand jury within the legitimate scope of their duties, as
stated by an early writer, is that "it would be of the utmost illconsequence in any way to discourage them from making their
inquries with that freedom and readiness which the public 'good
requires.""' It would seem, however, that the same reasoning applies where the grand jury through a mistake as to its powers acts
in a matter beyond its authority. Would not a contrary rule retard the administration of justice, which public policy most
strongly requires to be unfettered and untrammelled? At least
where they exceed their powers through an honest but erroneous
conception of their duties, should not grand jurors be exempt from
liability?
But does public policy demand an absolute immunity even
where they knowingly exceed their authority? If grand jurors
are perfectly aware that they are not empowered to take a certain
action, but wilfully do so from some improper motive, it seems
perfectly just to hold them liable. The difficulty, however, lies in
the fact that it is necessary to ascertain the state of mind of the
members of the grand jury, and to determine whether or not they
acted knowingly and wilfully. As this would have to be passed upon
That the court so meant to hold is -further indicated by the fact that it
quoted as follows from Bradley v. Heath, 12 Pick. 163 (Mass. 1831) : "Where
words imputing misconduct to another are spoken by one having a duty to
perform, and the words are spoken in good faith, and in the belief that it
comes within the discharge of that duty . . . no presumption of malice
arises from the speaking of the words, and therefore no action can be
maintained in such cases without proof of express malice." This is but a
form of the rule of qualified privilege
aSupra, note 5.
SSupra, note 6.
I Hawkins' P. C., ch. 73, sect. IO (ed. 1777). See also id. ch. %2,
sect. 5.
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by another jury in the event of a grand juror being sued, grand
jurors would perhaps be hampered by the fear that their motives,
though entirely honest, might be misconstrued, with consequent
liability to themselves. If their motives could be infallibly determined, they should be held to accountability; but inasmuch as this is
not possible, it may be argued that they should be given absolute immunity.
It is not certain, however, that public policy requires so extensive a privilege. It may be that the public interest is sufficiently conserved by allowing grand jurors a qualified privilege
where they mistakenly exceed their duties;1 but2 it is submitted
that at least a conditional immunity is imperative.'
E.E.

PROPERTY-TENANCY nY THE ENTIRETY-At common

law, hus-

band and wife did not take, under a conveyance of land to them
jointly, as tenants in common or as joint tenants, but each became
seized of the entirety, per tout, et non per my; the consequence of
which was that neither could dispose of any parts without the
assent of the other, but the whole remained to the survivor under
the original grant.' They were said to take a tenancy by the entireties because there were no moieties between husband and wife.
The reason for the rule was founded on the legal fiction of the
unity of husband and wife.
As a result of the various married women's acts, the question
soon arose as to whether this legislation had destroyed the legal
unity of husband and wife. A few jurisdictions have taken the
position that by these acts conferring upon married women the
legal right to acquire property and to hold and enjoy it free from
the husband's control, the rule that a conveyance to a husband and
wife made them tenants by entirety ceased to exist. 2 But it is
still the law in a majority of jurisdictions that regardless of the married women's acts, that where the conveyance is to husband and
wife without any words prescribing, qualifying or characterizing
' This is no doubt the view of the court in Rector v. Smith (supra,
note 6).
"The principal case, Rich v. Eason, supra, note 5, and Rector v. Smith,
upra, note 6, are the only reported cases in which the exact point discussed
is the subject of decision. The question is referred to obiter in Poston v.
Washington, etc., R. R. Co., 36 App. D. C. 359 (I9II), and in Parsons v.
Age-Herald Pub. Co., 181 Ala. 439 (1913). In the former case, there is a
dictum that the grand jury has no protection at all against action if it exceeds its authority; in the latter case, no definite ruling is made as to the
liability of the jurors themselves under such circumstances.
12 Blackstone 182; 2 Kents Comm. 113.
Clark v. Clark, 56 N. H. 05 (1875); Hoffman v. Stigers, 28 Iowa 302

(1869).
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the kind or quality of the estate which each shall take, the grantees
take as tenants by the entirety. 3 These courts take the view that the
design of the legislature in passing the acts was not to destroy the
unity of husband and wife, but to protect the wife's property, by
removing it from the control of the husband. Furthermore, there
is the theory that the acts did not have in view the force and effect
of the instrument by which an estate may be granted to a wife; but
that they operate upon her property rights only after such rights
have accrued.
May the grantor defeat this common law rule and give to the
husband and wife a different estate, by using express words in the
grant? Although there is some respectable authority for the position that at common law husband and wife could not take as tenants in common even though words to that effect were used in the
conveyance to them, 4 the great weight of authority seems to be
that if apt words were used husband and wife could take such an
estate even before the passage of the married women's acts.5 But
whatever may have been the rule at common law today the courts
are unanimous in holding that as a result of the acts, the rule as to
tenancy by entirety may be avoided by the intention of the grantor,
if such intention is shown by express words in the grant. 6
Until recent years Pennsylvania was the one exception. By a
long line of decisions following the case of Stuckey v. Keefe 7 the
courts adhered so strictly to the legal fiction of the unity of husband and wife, that they held that even after the Married Woman's
Acts it was impossible to convey to a husband and wife as tenants
in common or as joint tenants. But in the recent case of Blease v.
Anderson 8 that court by express words overruled its former decisions and Pennsylvania is now in accord with the general rule.
In this connection it is interesting to note a recent New York
case.5 A man deeded property to himself and his wife to hold as
tenants of the entirety. Later he willed all his property to his
wife and died in her lifetime. Under a direct inheritance tax the
state sought to levy a tax on half the property. Three of the judges
after pointing out that the grantor by express words in the grant
set forth a tenancy by entirety and that the Married Woman's Acts
had not abolished that form of tenancy, held that half the property
3

Bertles v. Numan, 92 N. Y. T56 (1883); Fulper v: Fulper, 54 N. J. E.
v. Diver, 56 Pa. io6 (r867).
'McCurdy v. Canning, 64 Pa. 133 (187o).
'Preston Estates, vol. I, p. 132; Hunt v. Blackburn, 128 U. S. 464 (1888);
Miner v. Brown, 133 N. Y. 308 (1892).
'Carroll v. Reidy, 5 App. D. C. 59 (D. C. 1896); Brown v. Brown, 133
Ind. 476 (5893); Stulcup v. Stulcup, 137 N. C. 305 (1904).
126 Pa. 397 (1856).
241 Pa. 198 (1913).
'In re Klatzls Estate, iio N. E. 181 (1915).
435 (5896); Diver
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was subject to the tax, because the grantor having failed expressly
to declare that the grantees were to take as joint tenants, created
a tenancy in common under a statute of the state.10 In other
words, unless a grantor by express words grants a joint tenancy,
the grantees shall take as tenants in common. Under this decision
it is impossible to create an estate by the entirety."
Three dissenting judges based their opinion upon the reasoning that mere implication drawn from a statute is not sufficient to
warrant a destruction of a principle of the common law. They,
therefore, held that the grantees took as tenants by the entirety, even
though the words "to hold as joint tenants" were not used in the
deed.
Even though it may seem that because of modern innovations
respecting the property rights of married women, estates by entireties have outlived the purpose of their creation and are out of harmony with present conditions, yet courts have wisely held that these
estates shall not be changed by mere implication. It is submitted
that the reasoning of the court in the principal case may eventually
result in abandoning the theory of the legal unity of husband and
wife by mere implication from legislative action. This change of
the long established rules governing title to real property should
be brought about only by express legislative enactment.
G.F.D.
103 R. S. (7th Ed.), p. 2174, sec. 44. The statute provides: "If a conveyance is made to two or more persons, unless it is expressly declared that
they are to take as joint tenants, they shall take as tenants in common."
, The Chief Justice, while dissenting from the reasoning of these judges
as to question of grantees not taking a tenancy by entirety, was in favor of
allowing the tax because of a liberal construction of the "Tax Law."

